INTRODUCTION
Tribal sovereignty has been recognized by the American government since the establishment of the United States and tribal sovereign immunity has been a part of American jurisprudence for over a century. This is especially true as this situation plays out in the pharmaceutical industry. Under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984 (the HatchWaxman Act), patent holders face a congressionally mandated validity review process established to balance the protection of innovation while also facilitating the entrance of low-cost drug alternatives into the market.
5
The Hatch-Waxman Act allows a pharmaceutical manufacturer to file an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to produce a low-cost generic version of a patented brand name drug. 6 In order to do this, the generic manufacturer must include a Paragraph IV certification in its application, which This transaction has been widely debated with some applauding the move as innovative and others ardently condemning it as a blatant delay tactic. Although the district court judge has already issued an opinion regarding the Restasis® patents, PTAB has recently extended their statutory deadline for issuing its final written decision from December 8, 2017 to April 6, 2018. 15 This Note will discuss the dual IPR and federal court system in place for reviewing the validity of patents and examine the discourse within the industry surrounding the Mylan v. Allergan case. This analysis will offer insight into the future of IPR challenges in the pharmaceutical context. Section I will provide relevant background information surrounding the issues affecting challenges of patent validity and implications of tribal sovereign immunity for generic pharmaceutical companies. Section II will examine a case study involving two pharmaceutical giants, Allergan and Mylan, which demonstrates the issues discussed 7 Id. 8 35 U.S.C. § § 311-19 (2016). 9 King L. Wong, Indian Tribal Sovereign Immunity Asserted in an IPR, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8646562b-50af-4668-ae72-2df6e814b69a. 10 Bates et al., supra note 2. 11 Id. 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 
Id.
15 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2016) (PTAB must issue a final determination in an IPR no later than one year after the date of a decision to grant the IPR petition. If there is good cause, PTAB may extend the deadline by no more than six months.).
in Section I. Section III will focus on the industry split regarding these issues and argue that tactics that attempt to gain patent protection for brand name drugs after statutory coverage has expired, like the one employed by Allergan, are detrimental to the balance that Congress endeavors to maintain between innovation and the entrance of low-cost drug alternatives to the pharmaceutical market.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Issues Affecting Challenges of Patent Validity
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) was formed on September 16, 2012 as part of the America Invents Act and is the federal agency responsible for granting U.S. patents and registering trademarks. 16 The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) works within the USPTO.
17
PTAB is composed of administrative patent judges (APJs), a Director and Deputy Director of the USPTO, the Commissioner for Patents, and the Commissioner for Trademarks.
18
APJs are required to be persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability, who must have worked, at some point in their professional career, as a patent examiner at the USPTO.
19
APJs are also generally required to have experience working in private practice, other government agencies, or in-house for a corporation and must be able to handle cases in various fields of technology.
20
APJs are responsible for adjudicating two different types of cases.
21
The first type are appeals from adverse decisions by patent examiners for questions of patentability in patent applications.
22
PTAB must decide the correctness of the examiner's decision in these cases.
23
The second type are trials under the America Invents Act to determine the patentability of issued patents. challenges by the USPTO.
25
PTAB has jurisdiction to hear an IPR under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an IPR may be instituted if there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition.
26
IPR provides a less expensive and expedited forum for patent litigation than a U.S. district court proceeding.
27
The two systems are often used in conjunction with each other.
28
IPR maintains its streamlined approach by holding a hearing before three APJs of PTAB rather than having a jury and by focusing on only specific invalidity issues to patents. 29 Therefore, no infringement issues or enforceability issues can be addressed in the IPR system.
30
The IPR process also must be completed within one year of PTAB's decision to hear the IPR.
31
Either party who does not agree with PTAB's final ruling on the validity or invalidity of a patent may appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is the court that oversees every patent appeal in the country. 32 Further, the parties may agree to settle at any time as long as PTAB agrees to end the IPR as well.
33
Anyone other than the patent owner may file an IPR.
34
This includes everyone from a third party to a competitor, and there is no requirement to show any dispute between the parties.
35
For example, if Company A is ready to launch a new product on the market and Company B is a competitor who holds a patent that may block Company A's new product from launching, Company A can file an IPR in order to invalidate Company B's patent and launch its product or vice versa.
Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Understanding the concept of sovereignty is a prerequisite to understanding tribal sovereign immunity. Sovereignty is the supreme independent authority within 27 Josh Landau, Inter Partes Review: Five Years, Over $2 Billion Saved, PATENT PROGRESS (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.patentprogress.org/2017/09/14/inter-partes-review-saves-over-2-billion. 28 Id. 29 Id. 30 Id. n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and the patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed."). 34 Inter Partes Review, supra note 31. a territory.
36
The sovereign must have authority or the right to command and be obeyed derived from a mutually acknowledged source of legitimacy from within the community.
37
The authority of the sovereign is superior to all other authorities in its domain.
38
The sovereign must also occupy territory and the individuals residing in that geographical location must be subject to its authority. 39 Tribal sovereignty was recognized as early as the time of European expansion, into what is now the United States of America, through treaties and a legal framework which continued throughout the American Revolution and the establishment of the U.S. 40 The U.S. is considered a federated state, meaning each state within the U.S. territory has transferred portions of their sovereign powers to the federal government. 41 Federally-recognized tribes are also subject to the authority of the federal government. 42 That being said, the U.S. government recognizes tribes as domestic sovereign, self-governing nations.
43
These tribes maintain a nation-tonation relationship with the United States and state governments have limited power over tribes.
44
It is a well-established rule that a federally-recognized Native American tribe is immune from lawsuits by anyone other than the United States, absent the tribe's consent or congressional abrogation. 45 This common law rule was established through a series of late 19th and early 20th Supreme Court decisions. 46 In Turner v. United States, the Court held that a tribe was barred from personal liability because "like other governments, municipal as well as state, the Creek Nation was free from liability for injuries to persons or property." 47 Further, the Court stated that "without authorization from Congress, the Nation could not then have been sued in any court; at least without its consent." 48 However, tribal sovereign immunity is a common-law privilege that is subject to regulation by Congress and not covered under the Eleventh 36 What is Sovereignty?, LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/sovereignty (last visited Mar. 3, 2018). 37 Id. 38 
Id.
39 What is Territorial Sovereignty?, supra note 36. 40 Seielstad, supra note 1, at 683. 41 Id. at 669. 42 Id. 43 Id. at 690. 44 Id. 45 
46 See Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919). 47 Id. at 357-58. 48 Id. at 358.
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 49 The immunity applies in federal or state court without regard to the relief sought or the nature of the controversy.
50
This immunity also may be waived by the tribe involved or by undisputed congressional abrogation. 51 Further, the immunity does not extend to actions taken by tribe members acting in their individual capacities, such as tribal officers or employees when they are alleged to have violated federal law.
52
B. Implications of Tribal Sovereign Immunity to Generic Pharmaceutical Companies
Understanding of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the ANDA process is required to demonstrate the balance Congress has put in place for brand name manufacturers and generic companies working in the pharmaceutical industry. In order to bring a new drug to market, a brand name drug manufacturer must submit a new drug application ("NDA") to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for approval, which is a long and costly process.
53
The NDA must describe aspects like a statement of the drug's components, scientific data showing that the drug is safe and effective, and proposed labeling describing the uses for which the drug may be marketed.
54
After the FDA has approved a brand name manufacturer's drug, the HatchWaxman Act provides a pathway for another company to seek permission to market a generic version of the same drug.
55
The Hatch-Waxman Act allows a generic competitor to file an abbreviated new drug application ("ANDA") which utilizes the information from a brand name manufacturer's already approved NDA. 56 Thus, instead of providing independent evidence of safety and efficacy, an ANDA need only show that the generic drug has the same active ingredients and is biologically equivalent to the brand name drug.
57
The Act, by allowing the generic drug manufacturer to use the brand name's approval efforts, speeds up the introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market. Thus, the ANDA process promotes drug competition and provides for inexpensive alternative medications to consumers.
The FDA is not allowed to approve a generic drug that would infringe on a brand name drug manufacturer's patent, so the timing of an ANDA's approval 49 Clay Smith, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A Primer, 50 ADVOC. 19, 20 (2007). 50 Id. 51 Id. 1) (2016). 54 Id. § § 355(b)(1), (d). 55 Id. 56 Id. § § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv). 57 
Id.
To approve generic drugs as soon as a brand name manufacturer's patents allow, a brand name drug manufacturer must file information about its patents with the FDA.
59
A brand name drug manufacturer must submit its NDA with the patent number and the expiration date of any patent which claims the drug for which the brand submitted the NDA.
60
Once an NDA is approved, the FDA publishes the information in the "Orange Book."
61
After consulting the Orange Book for relevant patents, a generic drug company wishing to file an ANDA must assure the FDA that its proposed generic drug will not infringe any of the listed patents.
62
When no patents are listed in the Orange Book or all listed patents have expired or will expire before the ANDA's approval, the generic manufacturer must supply assurance of this to the FDA. 63 What is referred to as a "Section VIII" statement gives the generic manufacturer an option to market the drug for methods of use not covered by the brand name's patents. 64 This option is mainly used when the brand name's patent on the drug compound expired, but the brand name still holds the patents on some approved methods of using the drug.
65
A Section VIII statement may allow the generic manufacturer to market the drug using labeling that does not infringe on the methods of use still patented by the brand name.
66
This is an exception to the rule that the generic drug must bear the same label as its brand name counterpart.
67
This allows the generic manufacturer to get its drug to market, assuming it has met the other ANDA requirements, but only for the approved methods of use not covered by the brand name's patents. In other words, the Hatch-Waxman Act allows a generic manufacturer to market a generic drug for unpatented uses even if other patented uses are not allowed. 68 There are several ways in which a generic manufacturer can provide assurance that its drug will not infringe the brand name's patents. 69 It can (1) certify that the 58 Caraco Pharmaceutical Labs v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012). 59 Id. 60 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). 61 The Orange Book is officially called Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations. The Orange Book identifies all drug products approved by the FDA. The FDA must also list all patents that purport to protect each drug in the Orange Book. 62 21 U.S.C. § § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(III). 63 Id. 64 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii). 65 Id. 67 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v), (j)(4)(G). 68 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii). 69 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
brand name manufacturer has not listed any relevant patents; (2) certify that any relevant patents have expired; (3) request approval to market beginning when any still in force patents expire; or (4) certify that any listed, relevant patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug described in the ANDA. 70 If a generic manufacturer employs the last method (the "Paragraph IV" method), it is a technical infringement of the brand name drug manufacturer's patents and, in most instances, leads to litigation. 71 The brand name manufacturer then must bring an infringement suit within 45 days causing the FDA to withhold final approval of the generic for 30 months while the matter is litigated. 72 If the court decides the matter within that period of time, the FDA will follow that determination; if the courts do not decide the matter within that time period, the FDA is free to give approval to market the generic drug. 73 Using the Paragraph IV method in order to be the first to file an ANDA with the FDA is incentivized in the Act. The applicant who files the ANDA first will receive 180 days of exclusivity in the market if it prevails in its litigation. 74 During this period of exclusivity, no other generic can come to market even if the patent(s) in question is found to be invalid. 75 The generic manufacturer that is first to file the ANDA is the only company that can enjoy the exclusivity period.
76
If the generic manufacturer that is first to file the ANDA forfeits its rights to exclusivity, no other generic manufacturer can obtain it. 73 
Id.
74 § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 75 Id.
§ 355(j)(5)(D)
. 77 Id. branded drug, Restasis®, which is used to treat chronic dry eye. 80 Restasis® is one of Allergan's blockbusters, accounting for about 15% of the company's profits and making $1.5 billion in sales in 2016 alone.
81
Restasis® was approved in 2003, with patent protection until 2014, which led generic manufacturers to prepare to enter the market.
82
In order to block these generic companies from entering the market, Allergan obtained new patents claiming minor variations of the drug which have patent protection until 2024.
83
After which time, and assuming no further exclusivities are granted, generic versions of the drug could enter the market leading to profit loss for the brand name drug manufacturer. 84 In August of 2015, Mylan was sued by Allergan in a Hatch-Waxman Act case surrounding the Restasis® patents.
85
The suit arose when Mylan filed an ANDA with the FDA in order to manufacture and sell low-cost bioequivalent drugs having the same components as Restasis® and challenged the Restasis® patents as invalid.
86
On June 3, 2016, Mylan filed six IPR challenges with PTAB in regards to the Restasis® patents.
87
On December 8, 2016, PTAB granted Mylan's petitions for IPR finding it reasonably likely that Allergan's evergreened patents were invalid.
88
Beginning on December 8, 2016, PTAB had a statutory deadline of exactly one year to complete the IPR.
89
The district court litigation has been decided, however, PTAB has extended its statutory deadline for IPR completion from December 8, 2017 to April 6, 2018. 
92
This was done in order to claim the Tribe's status as a sovereign nation and shield the Patents from review by the USPTO and ultimately, from competitors.
93
The license agreement expressly stated that the Tribe "will and shall assert its sovereign immunity in any Contested PTO Proceeding, including in the IPR Proceedings." 94 Allergan previously had to defend these Patents in federal district court against various generic pharmaceutical companies including Mylan. 95 Mylan, who stated that it would "vigorously oppose this transparent delay tactic before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board," filed an IPR petition against the Patents as well. 96 The Tribe, after the ownership change, filed a motion to terminate the pending IPR proceedings using the defense of sovereign immunity.
97
In the district court litigation decided in October of 2017, Judge William Bryson issued a ruling regarding this dispute between Allergan and Mylan over the Restasis® patents.
98
Before reaping the benefits of the deal, the judge invalidated four of the six Allergan Patents at issue because they described methods of treatment that were obvious in light of earlier patents granted to the company. 99 More interestingly, however, the court condemned Allergan's transaction with the Tribe stating that, "[w]hat Allergan seeks is the right to continue to enjoy the considerable benefits of the U.S. patent system without accepting the limits that Congress has placed on those benefits."
100
The court went on to seriously question the legitimacy of this kind of deal stating that the Tribe's sovereign immunity should not be treated 91 Despite these contentions, Allergan has maintained that the reasoning behind this transaction was to protect against "double jeopardy" in patent disputes when brand name companies must defend their patents in both federal court and at PTAB.
Allergan and Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe Announce Agreements
102
More recently, on February 23, 2018, PTAB issued a decision denying the Tribe's motion to terminate Mylan's patent challenge regarding the Restasis® patents.
103
PTAB determined that the Tribe did not establish that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity applied to IPR proceedings. 104 Further, PTAB found that even if tribal sovereign immunity did apply, the IPR proceeding could continue with or without the Tribe's participation because Allergan retained ownership interest in the challenged patents. 105 The oral hearing for this case is now scheduled for April 3, 2018 and PTAB has pushed its final written opinion deadline again from April 6, 2018 to June 6, 2018.
106
This case is the first time tribal sovereign immunity will be considered by PTAB. 107 Here, what may be the most interesting is the timing of the transaction. On June 3, 2016, Mylan filed six petitions for IPR review for the Restasis® patents which were owned at that time by Allergan.
108
On September 8, 2017, one week prior to the date scheduled for oral hearing in the IPR, the transaction took place.
109
The Tribe then notified PTAB about the new ownership of the patents, obtained leave, and filed a motion to terminate the IPR proceedings for the Restasis® patents for lack of jurisdiction on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity.
110
The three cases prior to this where PTAB had considered issues of state sovereign immunity differed from the present case, because, in those cases, the sovereign patent owner had ownership 101 Id. of the patents prior to the beginning of the IPR proceedings and were protected under the Eleventh Amendment. 111 However, in this case, the patents involved in the transaction were already subject to IPR at the time the Tribe took ownership of them and there is no Eleventh Amendment defense.
III. THE INDUSTRY SPLIT: INNOVATION OR UNJUST DELAY TACTIC?
The Allergan transaction at issue has stirred controversy in the industry, with everyone from reporters to practitioners to judges weighing in on the debate. Evidence of this controversy lies in the PTAB's decision to allow submission of amicus briefs in the Allergan IPR proceedings for the first time in a post-grant challenge.
113
Allergan leads one side of the discussion, hailing the transaction as an innovative way to ward off intellectual property challenges.
Secondarily, Allergan has stated that another goal is to help the Tribe become self-reliant and diversify its economy.
116
In an Allergan press release about this transaction, Bob Bailey stated that, "the Tribe's thoughtful and enterprising approach . . . will allow them to achieve their goals of self-reliance and help them address the most urgent needs in their community." Mylan leads the other side of the debate that this "protection scheme" is an unjust and illegal tactic used in attempts to shield vulnerable patents from competition for as long as possible.
121
In regards to the Tribe's assertion of tribal sovereign immunity at PTAB, Mylan adamantly has maintained the position that this tactic could not be upheld for various reasons on the merits such as the public policy argument against monetizing sovereign immunity as a commodity, but also because the Tribe waived its immunity.
122
In a telephonic hearing before PTAB on September 11, 2017, just three days after the transaction was made public, Mylan said:
[T]his transaction is a sham. There's no reason to believe that it will lead to any success. But in any case, there's an unequivocal waiver here. Mylan expects to have a lot of arguments on the merit, but you should have confidence that this motion can't succeed because they have clearly sought out this forum. Mylan did not drag them into this forum. [. . .] Rather, by their own admissions to the press-the press releases, they have-the tribe has said that they have sought this out as an opportunity that they are marketing to patentees, that this is basically a protection scheme that they have put forth. [. . .] They are going to patentees who they think have weak patents and are at risk of cancellation, and they are offering this protective service. They are explicitly selling immunity. 123 Many join Mylan in this line of reasoning including PTAB in its recent denial of the Tribe's motion to terminate the IPR and Judge Bryson, the appellate court judge sitting by designation and presiding over the ANDA case who recently held Allergan's patents invalid as obvious. U.S. patent system without accepting the limits that Congress has placed on those benefits through the administrative mechanism for cancelling invalid patents. If that ploy succeeds, any patentee facing IPR proceedings would presumably be able to defeat those proceedings by employing the same artifice. In short, Allergan's tactic, if successful, could spell out the end of the PTO's IPR program, which was the central component of the America Invents Act of 2011. 126 The judge shares Mylan's concerns that this patent expiration delay tactic is a massive abuse of the system put in place by the legislature which could render it meaningless if allowed. 127 Further, Judge Bryson also agrees that this commodification of the Tribe's sovereign immunity cannot be tolerated.
128
Others in the industry have also harshly criticized the arrangement, including various senators.
129
Among these Congressmen, Senator Claire McCaskill has been outspoken about her contempt for this deal.
130
In a letter she wrote to the pharmaceutical lobbying group, PhRMA, she said, " [t] his is one of the most brazen and absurd loopholes I've ever seen, and it should be illegal. Given its recent comments regarding corporate responsibility, PhRMA can and should play a role in telling its members that the action isn't appropriate, and I hope they do that."
131
Following a bipartisan U.S. House of Representatives committee decision to investigate the transaction early in October of 2017, the senator introduced legislation seeking to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity as a defense in IPR.
132
She went on to say, "Congress never imagined tribes would allow themselves to be used by pharmaceutical companies to avoid challenges to patents, and this bill will shut the practice down before others follow suit."
133
In putting forth this bill, Senator McCaskill sought to address the fear that Judge Bryson put forth in his opinion: to save the IPR procedure by disallowing the practice of selling tribal sovereign 126 Id. 127 Id. 132 Michael Erman, Senator McCaskill drafts bill in response to Allergan patent maneuver, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2017, 2:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-allergan-patents-congress/senatormccaskill-drafts-bill-in-response-to-allergan-patent-maneuver-idUSKBN1CA2D0. 133 Id.
immunity for the purpose of evading PTAB. While the bill has garnered some support, its critics have called it discriminatory and unlikely to get at the root of the problem.
134
As previously mentioned, PTAB has also decided to allow amicus briefs for the first time in a post-grant challenge which were to be filed by December 1, 2017. 135 Jumping at the opportunity to weigh in on this issue of first impression for PTAB, various industry players effected by the outcome filed amicus briefs for both Mylan and Allergan. 136 For example, U.S. Inventor, LLC, a nation-wide inventor advocacy organization with over 13,000 members, submitted a brief in support of the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe. 137 Its main argument is that PTAB lacks the jurisdiction and expertise to make the determination in this case. 138 In the brief, U.S. Inventor LLC claims that Congress possess exclusive authority over the application of sovereign immunity, and it would be a "flagrant encroachment" on that authority to allow PTAB to decide whether sovereign immunity may be used to divest the Board of Jurisdiction. 139 The brief goes on to argue that the proper forum for the parties to challenge tribal sovereign immunity is in federal district court and concludes by claiming that the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on tribal sovereign immunity filed by the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe should be granted. 140 Conversely, Askeladden LLC, founder of the Patent Quality Initiative, an education, information, and advocacy effort to improve the understanding, use, and reliability of patents, filed an amicus brief in opposition to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe's motion to dismiss. 141 Askeladden LLC based its brief on four arguments: that (1) the Tribe's motion is based on the misplaced theory that Tribal Sovereign Immunity is applicable to administrative proceedings before PTAB, (2) even if the Tribe cannot be compelled to participate in the proceeding, there is no requirement under the AIA that a patent owner participate in order for it to proceed, (3) the subsequent transaction by the Patent Owner and the Tribe cannot and should not be entitled to divest PTAB of its rights and duty to complete these proceedings, and (4) the transaction is nothing more than a sham.
142
The arguments put forth by Askeladden LLC align with those of Mylan, Judge Bryson, and Senator McCaskill, in reasoning that the transaction between Allergan and the Tribe is a sham and this behavior should not be allowed to prevent PTAB from arriving at its final written decisions in IPR proceedings. For those reasons, Askeladden LLC urged PTAB to deny the Tribe's motion to dismiss and to complete its second look at the patents it previously granted, with or without the Tribe's participation. 143 As for the public at large, many practitioners working in the industry or related fields have written articles, created blog posts, and taken to social media to voice their opinions about this unprecedented transaction. Steve Brachmann, a freelance writer for IPWatchdog, seems to favor the transaction as an innovative way to protect Allergan's patents. 144 In his piece surrounding the Allergan deal, he states that:
The unintended problems and abuses of the IPR process at PTAB would concern any patent owner and naturally drive a party like Allergan to seek out an arbitrage opportunity with the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe to protect assets from the PTAB while engaged in Hatch-Waxman litigation. 145 On the other side of the debate, Joe Nacera, a columnist for Bloomberg View, characterized the deal between Allergan and the Tribe as Allergan's way of evading the law. 146 He used the word 'sleazy' to describe the transaction.
147
Nacera went on to criticize Allergan for potentially paving the way to the end of the patent review process.
148
In addition to his reaction to the deal itself, Nacera went on to explain that the Restasis® patents should have expired in 2014 meaning low-cost generic alternatives should have been available to consumers years ago.
149
He combines this with the transaction and Allergan's social contract to consumers of not raising its drug prices to reach his less than reputable opinion of the company.
Along the same lines, Brad Loncar, a prominent biotech investor, was similarly upset by the transaction and felt it reflected poorly on the industry as a whole. 151 He posted his opinion on his Twitter account about the transaction on the day the deal went public. 152 Loncar said, " [t] his is going to impact all of us. Will be the next major black eye pharma story. Thanks [Allergan] ." 153 It is easy to see how this controversial deal has caused a large divide within the industry. Some praise the deal as an innovative way to escape the review of patents at PTAB. Others are shocked by the tactic calling it "sleazy" and a sham. Needless to say, there are many proponents and opponents of this transaction, all with varying opinions of how to handle tribal sovereign immunity as it relates to patents that a sovereign tribe obtains at the end of the IPR proceeding.
There are some recent cases that have been brought before PTAB which also provide insight into the rationale of PTAB and how it views its role in these cases. The recent decision and rationale of PTAB in Ericsson Inc. and Telfonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota is one of those cases. The Ericsson and Allergan cases share many similarities and yielded the same outcome despite the fact that Minnesota's sovereign immunity is constitutionally protected and tribal sovereign immunity is not. 154 The question before PTAB was the same as the question in the Allergan case: Does sovereign immunity provide a defense for a patent owner against IPR challenges?
155
On December 19, 2017, PTAB issued an order dismissing the University of Minnesota's sovereign immunity challenge and asserted its right to review the validity of the University's patents. 156 PTAB reasoned that the University had waived its own right to immunity from administrative review when it filed suits in district court against Ericsson and other companies accusing them of infringing on the same patents.
selectively invoke its sovereign immunity to ensure that a defendant is barred from requesting an IPR of the asserted patent from a different branch of the same federal government. 158 It is clear through this decision and PTAB's dismissal of the Tribe's motion to dismiss in the Allergan case that PTAB intends to limit the use of sovereign immunity as a defense to IPR challenges and that it believes it rightfully has jurisdiction to decide these matters. Due to these decisions, Allergan's transaction with the Tribe will not be of use in shielding the Restasis® patents from IPR.
If Allergan's transaction were allowed to proceed, it could have had serious consequences on the patent legal framework Congress has put in place. Put another way, a tribe's sovereign immunity would essentially be rendered a commodity that could be bought and sold in order for patent owners to evade IPR making IPR proceedings useless. The consequences are amplified when put in the context of the pharmaceutical industry. While this scheme may be beneficial to tribes who are looking for new sources of income as well as for innovators who hold patents for valuable brand name drugs, it is very detrimental to potential generic competitors and, in turn, consumers of drugs who may need a low-cost alternative.
One main reason Congress created IPR proceedings was to create an efficient system for challenging wrongly issued patents.
159
In the Allergan case, the IPR process Congress intended has been undermined and made inefficient through Allergan's tactic. PTAB has been forced to push its statutory deadline for reaching its final decision from December of 2017 to June of 2018. Not only can this be interpreted as contrary to Congress's intent when creating PTAB, but Allergan will also reap the benefits of having its blockbuster drug on the market exclusively for at least an extra four months. Taking into consideration that annual profits of Restasis® are approximately $1.5 billion, Allergan will make approximately $500 million in those four months disregarding any royalties owed to the Tribe. 160 While this affects potential generic competitors, the ultimate loser in this case is the consumers who are left with no low-cost alternatives to the medication they need for a much longer time than should be allowed by law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Allergan's tactic for delaying the expiration of its patents for the branded drug Restasis® is exactly what Congress in enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act sought to avoid. For the pharmaceutical industry to thrive, there needs to be a balance between the innovators who produce brand name drug products and the generic companies which seek to provide customers with inexpensive alternatives. Brand name manufactures must be incentivized to innovate by enjoying patent protection long enough to recoup the expenses that went into the research and development of a new drug while making a profit. However, generic competitors must be allowed to enter the market through Congressionally created mechanisms such as IPR in order to provide consumers with low-cost options to the medications they desperately need.
